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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAEGAN DANIELLE FRANCIS,
individually, and as the
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Edward Kenneth
Francis, Jr., deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Court of Appeals No. 970651-CA
Priority No. 15
(Oral Argument Requested)

EDWARD K. FRANCIS, SR., and
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is invoked
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) and Utah R.
App. P. 42.

Statement of Issues
Was any behavior by Defendants preceding or following the
suicide of their son "outrageous behavior11 sufficient to
support an award of damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Did ..ny behavior on the part of Defendant cause Plaintiff's
severe emotional distress.
Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent
evidence of fair market value.

4.

Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent
evidence of a demand for the return of the allegedly
converted property.

5.

Were the trial court's findings of fact relative to the
values of allegedly converted property clearly erroneous.

Standard of Appellate Review
Issue One presents a mixed question of fact and law.

In

reviewing a mixed question of fact and law, the trial
determinations of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous"
standard.

Ultimate conclusions, as well as conclusions of law

are reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the
finder of fact.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 932, 938 (Utah

1994); Trolley Square Assos. v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
Issues Two, Five, and Six present questions of fact.

The

appeals court reviews questions of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard, setting them aside when there is not substantial
evidence to justify the finding.

Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846

P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Klinger v. Knightly. 889 P.2d 1372,
1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); House v. Armour of America. 856 P.2d
542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah R.Civ. P. 52.
Issues Three and Four present questions of law.

Questions

of law are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the
determination made by the trial court.

jQuflas Vt F Q X Television

Stations. Inc.. 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996); Harline v- Barker/
-2-

912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); Nelson v. Betit. 937 P.2d 1298,
1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

Determinativ

statutory Provisions

The issues in this case pertain to the common law doctrines
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion.
There are no determinative statutory provisions in this case.

Statement of the Case

Nature Qf the Case
Plaintiff/Appellee filed a complaint in the Sixth Judicial
District Court for Sevier County.

Plaintiff brought this action

following the tragic suicide of her husband, Edward Kenneth
Francis, Jr., who was also the son of the Defendants.

Plaintiff

sought a money judgement against her former in-laws under three
separate causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (2)
received.

conversion; and (3) money had and

Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded

judgement in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants on
Plaintiff's two tort theories.

It is from this judgement that

the Defendants appeal.

Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 4 May 1994. Discovery was
conducted, and a trial was held on 14 and 15 November 1996. The
-3-

trial court issued an 18 page written decision which was entered
23 January 1997.1

A judgement was prepared and entered by the

court on 9 May 1997. Notice of appeal was filed on 2 June 1997.
It is from the trial court's decision and the judgement based
thereupon that Plaintiff!s appeal.

True and correct copies of

the Memorandum Decision and the Judgment are attached hereto as
Appendices A and B, respectively.

Statement Qf Facts
1.

The decedent, Edward Kenneth Francis, Jr., was the son of
Defendants and the husband of Plaintiff.

To distinguish him

from his father, Defendant Edward Francis, he was called
"Little Ed." Trial Transcript, pp. 45-46
2.

Little Ed was born in 1968 in South Dakota and graduated
from Payson High School, in Utah County, in 1986. He
suffered from a life-long affliction of mild spastic
cerebral palsy, which affected primarily his left side. As
a result of his cerebral palsy, Little Ed was unable to hold
a steady job and had difficulty with the use of his left
hand.

While he could hold things in his left hand, he had

difficulty picking things up with it, particularly small
object on flat surfaces, like a pencil or a nail on a table

1. The Plaintiff/Appellee did not prepare Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law but merely submitted a judgment. The
trial court's Memorandum Decision contains an extensive review of
the facts. See Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Appendix
A.
-4-

top.

Prior to and during the course of his marriage to

Plaintiff, Little Ed worked for perhaps three months as a
carpet layer!s assistant.

He ultimately had to be

terminated in November 1993, around the time he and
Plaintiff wed.

Trial Transcript, pp. 303, 308-09, 317-20,

348-49.
In July, 1993, Little Ed met Plaintiff, Raegan Francis.
They became intimate, and by 11 September 1993, Raegan was
pregnant.

Raegan and Little Ed were married by a justice of

the peace in Richfield, Sevier County Utah, on 12 November
1993.

At the time of the marriage, Little Ed had been

divorced once but had no children.

Raegan had not been

married previously, but had an eighteen month old child.
Raegan was 17; Little Ed was 26.

Immediately following

their marriage, Little Ed and Raegan lived with her parents
for a brief tirr

Aurora, Utah, a few miles from Salina.

This was an unsatisfactory arrangement, and within the
month, Little Ed and Raegan moved in with Defendants.

Trial

Transcript, pp. 47-52, 58
Defendants determined to assist Little Ed and Raegan in the
purchase of a home.

In January 1994, Defendants purchased a

home in Sigurd, Utah, a few miles from their home in Salina.
They allowed Little Ed and Raegan to live in the home,
provided they paid rent.
to pay the mortgage.

Defendants used the rent in turn

Little Ed and Raegan moved into the

home in January 1994 and made a single rent payment for the
-5-

month of February 1994.

Significantly, neither Little Ed

nor Raegan paid any rent for March, 1994.

Trial Transcript,

pp. 59, 62-64.
5.

The relationship between Little Ed and Raegan was chaotic
and stormy.

Raegan was not mentally stable.2

Raegan

reported, without any corroboration, that Little Ed was
controlling, abusive and unfaithful to her.

Their marriage

was marked by disharmony, acrimony, poor relations with
their respective in-laws, and even suicidal behavior from
the beginning, although Raegan testified that there were
periods of happiness as well.

App. D; App. E; Trial

Trnascript, pp. 53-57; 66-74.
6.

Shortly following their marriage, both Little Ed and Raegan
quit or lost their jobs.

Their sole source of income was

public assistance payments and disability benefits which
Little Ed received as a result of his disability.

The only

other source of income was a very substantial amount of
money which Defendants provided to Raegan and Little Ed and
Defendants1 efforts on behalf of their son and his wife to
purchase a home, finance the purchase on their own credit,
and provide funds and property to furnish the house.

Trial

Transcript, pp. 62-64, 116-68, 276-77, 279-81, 308-09; 317.
7.

Little Ed and Raegan ! s relationship came to a violent,
lonely end.

2.

On 16 March 1994, Little Ed and Raegan had a

See Statement of Fact, 1 34.
-6-

bitter quarrel.

Raegan decided to move from the Sigurd home

and began to pack things.

The argument continued throughout

most of the day on 16 March.

At some point, both Little Ed

and Raegan called their respective parents and police
officers were present at least twice during the day.

Raegan

began to pack items to take with her and a dispute arose
regarding what was to be taken.

Trial Transcript, pp. 68-

75; 110-114, 238.
Raegan ultimately removed a carload and two pickup loads of
material from the home on 16 March 1994. There were violent
confrontations between Little Ed and Raegan, and their
respective parents on 16 March 1994. At some point during
the day, Raegan and Defendant Patricia Francis had a
confrontation in the kitchen of the Sigurd home. Mrs.
Francis attempted to get the telephone receiver away from
Raegan, and they both fell to the floor wrestling.

Raegan

ended on top of Mrs. Francis. At one point on Wednesday, 16
March 1994, Plaintiff's mother had become enraged.
in the living room of the Sigurd home.

She was

In her rage she

kicked the gun cabinet, breaking the glass and the door
frame.

Trial Transcript, pp. 69-78, 266-67, 306-08, 320-22,

337, 366-70.
At another point on 16 March 1994, a Sevier County Deputy
Sheriff named Jack Peterson was present at the Sigurd home.
He was assisting Raegan in gathering certain items to remove
from the home and was alone with her in a bedroom.
-7-

In an

effort to make conversation and diffuse Raeganfs tense mood,
he offhandedly asked her about her children and about her
obvious pregnancy.

Raegan told Deputy Peterson that the

two-year-old child was not Little Ed f s, and moreover, that
Little Ed was not the father of her unborn child.

Upon

questioning from the officer, Raegan reported that she had
not yet told Little Ed.

Deputy Peterson advised Raegan not

to mention the paternity at that time give the agitated
situation.

Raegan denied this conversation occured.

Notwithstanding the officerfs advise, as she was leaving the
Sigurd home on Wednesday, 16 March 1994, Raegan yelled for
all to hear, including Little Ed, that Little Ed was not the
father of the unborn child.

Raegan testified that she made

this remark for the express purpose of upsetting Little Ed.
Trial Transcript, pp. 233-36; 73-74, 376-77.
10.

Approximately a week prior to this confrontation, Raegan and
Little Ed together with Defendants, and Little Ed's brother
in-law, John Ore, installed a fence at the Sigurd home.
one point John Ore and Raegan were alone.

At

Raegan reported

to John Ore that Little Ed was not the father of her unborn
child.

John responded that Raegan ought to tell Little Ed,

but took no actions to tell Little Ed himself.
denied this conversation occured.
241-42, 245, 376-77.

-8-

Raegan

Trial Transcript, pp.

Following the confrontation with their respective parents
Raegan and Little Ed met later in the evening 16 March 1994,
and continued discussion through the morning of Thursday, 17
March 1994. By early morning, it was apparent that they
could not resolve their differences.

Raegan reported that

Little Ed gave her an ultimatum that she stop seeing her
parents or get out.

Raegan requested to be taken back to

her parent's home in Aurora.
wedding ring.

Raegan gave Little Ed her

Trial Transcript, pp. 79-82, 181.

Little Ed had continued to be upset and concerned about
Raeganfs claim that the unborn child Raegan was carrying was
not his. According to Raegan, he asked at least three times
during the course of this conversation whether the child was
his.

In response to each question, Raegan assured Little Ed

that the unborn child was his.

She claimed that Little Ed

and her made their peace before separating on Thursday
morning.

Trial Transcript, pp. 82, 376-78.

Later, on Thursday, 17 March 1994, Little Ed hitched and
drove with a small utility trailer to his parents home in
Salina.

He retrieved certain items of property owned by him

and Raegan.
property.

He had the entire utility trailer loaded with

Other than a baby crib, Defendants were unable to

see what property was in the trailer.

When questioned what

he was doing, Little Ed responded that the marriage was over
and that he was throwing things away.
-9-

Apparently, Little Ed

drove to the county landfill and disposed of the items in
the trailer.

Defendants made no response and did not assist

Little Ed in this endeavor.
14•

Trial Transcript, pp. 331.

In the evening of Thursday, 17 March 1994, Little Ed called
his father, Defendant Ed Francis, and asked him to come
visit with him.

Mr. Francis left his home, and drove the

few miles to Sigurd.

They talked for about an hour.

They

discussed how Little Ed was feeling, the impending divorce,
and other items a son and a father would discuss.

Defendant

Ed Francis kept medication for Little Ed's use and benefit.
Little Ed asked for a sleeping pill, which Ed Francis
provided to him.
goodbye and left.

Mr. Francis saw his son get into bed, said
He never saw his son again.

Trial

Transcript, pp. 346-47; 35.
15.

The next morning Little Ed arose and walked to a nearby
general store.
back home.

He purchased some cigarettes, and walked

Evidently he took a shower, and while wrapped in

a towel sat on one of the rocking chairs in his home, loaded
a Winchester .30-30 rifle with a single bullet.

He pulled

the trigger and died from a single gunshot wound to the
head.

See Rolin Report; admitted at trial as Plaintiff's

Exhibit 21.
16.

Trial Transcript, pp. 118-22.

The same morning, 18 March 1994, Raegan decided to visit
Little Ed.

She attempted to find friends to go with her,

but her friends were preparing to go to the prom that
-10-

evening.

She arrived alone at the Sigurd home at

approximately 11:00 A.M.

She sensed an eery stillness.

She

looked around and knocked on the door, but no one appeared
to let her in.

She let herself in the back door, and walked

into the kitchen.
answered.

She called for Little Ed, but no one

As she walked through the kitchen, she first saw

a pair of legs, and walked into the living room to find
Little Ed's body.
17.

Trial Transcript, pp. 83-88.

Raegan was the first person to discover the grisly death
scene of her husband.

She returned to the kitchen and found

a note in Little Ed's handwriting.

The note said:

Ask for my Dad Ed Francis
To the person that fine this letter it go to My Mom &
Dad
Their number is 529-7322 well that is about it
Love you Mom & Dad But I can't go on in life asking
more
Because I a fuck up in every one life so don't...
[three illegible words]
See Letter attached hereto as Appendix C.3

Trial

Transcript, pp. 87-88.
18.

Raegan first called 911 and then called Mrs. Francis.

Trial

Transcript, pp. 86-88.
19.

Neighbors in the area had heard the gunshot and began to
arrive soon thereafter.

Police officers responded to the

scene quickly as well.

Raegan was extremely upset —almost

3. The suicide note was recieved into evidence as part of
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, the police report of the suicide. Trial
Transcript, p. 124.
-11-

hysterical.

The entire scene was disturbing, shocking, and

bloody. Trial Transcript, pp. 86-88, 119-21.
20.

Raegan discovered her husband's body slumped in a chair,
with a gunshot wound to the head, made by a high powered
hunting rifle at close range.

Bleeding had occurred

profusely from the head wound.

The bullet had exited the

skull, soiling the surrounding area.

Little Ed was wrapped

only in a towel at the time of his death.

The chair in

which he was sitting was saturated with his blood.4

When

the body was ultimately removed, it was wrapped in a Mexican
blanket found at the home.5

Trial Transcript, pp. 83-88,

118-24, 334, 335.
21.

Almost immediately Raegan began to have symptoms of labor.
By 1:00 P.M., no more than 2 hours later, she was admitted
to the Gunnison Valley Hospital.

The admission history and

physical for this hospitalization notes:
Earlier this morning her husband committed suicide with
a shotgun and the patient unfortunately found his body
earlier this morning. Due to her kidney infection,
dehydrated state, as well as pregnancy state, and
inability to eat or drink at the present time and now
coupled with the acute grief and stress reaction with
the suicide of her husband she's admitted to the
4. In one of the more macabre and appalling aspects of the
Plaintiff's case, she sought to recover, under her conversion
theory, for the value of this very chair. Fortunately, the judge
refused to accept this particular item of damage, though without
comment or analysis.
5. Strangely, the judge awards Plaintiff damages for the
alleged conversion of this particular item.
-12-

hospital for IV hydration and treatment of her
infection.
Raegan was admitted with a diagnosis of kidney infection,
acute grief reaction, dehydration, and intrauterine
pregnancy.

Raegan remained in Gunnison Valley Hospital

until Wednesday, 23 March 1994. Copies of these medical
records are attached hereto as Appendix D.6

Trial

Transcript, pp. 87-89.
22.

With Raegan hysterical and confined to the hospital, Mr. and
Mrs. Francis proceeded to make arrangements for the
disposition of their son's body.

At some point during her

hospitalization, she demanded that she be allowed to make
the funeral arrangements.

At first through their attorney,

David S. Kunz, and again over the phone, the Francis1
informed Raegan that they had no objection to her making the
funeral arrangements.

However, if she insisted upon so

doing, they would not pay for such arrangements, but would
pay their respects at the funeral home and leave it to
Raegan and her family to do take care of.

She declined this

offer and authorized the Francis' to proceed with the
arrangements.

The Francis' proceeded to have their son's

body cremated and held a memorial service7 with the pastor
6. These medical records were recieved into evidence as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11. Trial Transcript, pp. 21-22.
7. Mr. Springer distinguished the service the Defendant's
had for Little Ed from a funeral, calling it a memorial service,
-13-

of their church on Tuesday, 22 March 1994.

following

The

day, Raegan was released from Gunnison Valley Hospital.
App. D; Trial Transcript pp. 88-91, 102-09
23.

Based upon information provided by Defendants, the funeral
home prepared the memorial service program and had the
obituary published in the Salina Sun.

Joe Springer, the

funeral director, obtained the information needed to prepare
the memorial service program and the obituary from Defendant
Ed Francis.

He testified that Ed Francis told him that

Little Ed was divorced at the time of his death. Mr.
Francis testified that he could not recall what was said,
understandably distraught at the death of his son.

Trial

Transcript, pp. 102-08; 349-51.
24.

In any event, under Mr. Springer's direction, an obituary
for Little Ed was published in the Salina Sun which
contained no mention of Raegan, Raegan!s unborn child, or
Raegan1s two year old child.

Approximately one month later,

an obituary was published in the Provo Herald.

Neither Mr.

Springer nor Mr. and Mrs. Francis had any role in the
publication of this obituary.

Little Ed's sister, Teresa

Ore, evidently felt that it was appropriate to provide
notice to Little Ed's friends in Payson of his death.
Accordingly, Teresa took it upon herself to prepare and pay

Trial Transcript, pp. 101-102.
-14-

for an obituary in the Provo Herald.

Again this obituary

included no reference whatsoever to Raegan or her children.
Trial Transcript, pp. 92-95, 102-08, 340-51,
Following Little Ed's death, the Defendant's proceeded to
clean the Sigurd home.

Initially, they arranged for a

specialized cleaner to clean the bloody suicide scene. His
name was Theron B. Shaw.

This was done within a day or two

within Little Ed's suicide. As he cleaned out the home, Mr.
Shaw questioned what was going to be done with the gun
cabinet, broken by Raegan's mother, and the blood soaked
chair where Little Ed had been sitting when he took his
life.

Mr. Francis allowed Mr. Shaw to take the chair and

the gun cabinet in lieu of cash payment.

Trial Transcript,

pp. 128-32, 335-37.
At some point, the other property in the house was removed.
Raegan testified that she believed the property was removed
on Saturday, 19 March 1994, although she was hospitalized at
the time.

Conversely, she also testified that after her

release from the hospital she went back to the house and
looked around on 24 March 1994.

She looked in the window to

the house and saw personalty therein.

The Defendants

testified that other than the broken gun cabinet and the
bloody chair exchanged with Mr. Shaw, it was some time,
perhaps a few weeks before they commenced cleaning the

-15-

Sigurd home.

Trial Transcript, pp. 97, 313, 333, 335, 337,

360-61.
Curiously, Plaintiff's 18 March 1994 hospitalization records
contain references to two phone calls which were upsetting
to her.

First, was a phone call from the Sevier County

Sheriff on 20 March 1994 at 8:00 P.M.
this call is provided.

No information about

Second, on 21 March 1994 at 8:30

P.M., she received a phone call from an unidentified caller.
She reported to the nurse that it was "^about in laws going
to try and take my baby when born.'"

No mention of funeral

arrangements is made. No mention os calls to or from David
S. Kunz or Defendants is made.

No mention of property being

taken is made by Plaintiff while hospitalized at this time.
See Appendix D; But cf., Trial Transcript, pp. 88-90.
Following her release from the hospital, on 23 March 1994,
Raegan had no contact with the Defendants directly.

She did

not return to the home in Sigurd nor did she request
permission to do so.
she now claims.

Plaintiff did not demand the property

The Defendants proceeded to clean out the

home placing many items, which Plaintiff seeks to recover
for, in storage where they were held throughout the pendency
of this litigation.
items.

Defendants disposed of certain other

Yet other items were taken by Little Ed, the day

before his death to the dump.

Plaintiff's mother claimed to

have found certain minor items which she believed belonged
-16-

to Plaintiff at a garage sale held by Plaintiffs many months
later.

Trial Transcript, pp. 89-100, 313, 335-39, 351-60;

282-84/ 371-73.
29.

Plaintiff claims that 68 different items or groups of items
were converted by Defendants.
a.

She claimed that the following items were in the Payson
storage unit: a lawn mower, a tiller, two twin
mattresses, a night stand, a shovel, a hoe, two rakes,
a microwave oven, a kitchen table and four chairs, a
refrigerator, a daybed, bunk beds, toys, and a stereo.
Of these items, Plaintiff specifically testified that
she traded the daybed with the Defendants for the
mattresses.

She stated at trial that she did not end

up with either the daybed or the mattresses.
Transcript, pp. 197-98.
damages for both

Trial

The trial court awarded

the mattresses and the daybed, even

though Plaintiff's own testimony clearly established a
right to only one or the other.

See App. A, Memorandum

Decision, pp. 10-11, items 13 and 32.
b.

Plaintiff claimed Defendants simply took and disposed
of other items: a CB radio, a tool box, a barbeque, 10
blankets, 6 sheet sets, 6 pillows, 3 afgans, a
comforter, 2 full mattresses, a 40 piece sterling
silverware set, 2 alarm clocks, a safe, 2 coolers, a
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bank account,8 money in Little Ed's wallet, money in a
piggy bank, a cutting block table, an entertainment
center, 20 towels and 15 wash rags, a baby crib, 2
laundry baskets, a 35 millimeter camera with
accessories,9 kitchenware, kitchen towels, an electric
drill and bits, two tablecloths, food, a love seat, two
rocking chairs,10 two oil lamps, a lantern, a wooden
gun case,11 five guns, three lamps, two lamp shades, a
child safety gate, one-hundred phonograph records, twohundred cassette tapes, sixty video tapes, a Nintendo
game, two wooden rockers, a coffee table and two end
tables, two Mexican rugs,12 twelve wall pictures, a
shop vacuum and two other vacuums, and Little Ed's and
Raegan's wedding rings.13
8. The bank account was an account maintained in the names
of Little Ed and Defendant Patricia Francis. Plaintiff was
unable to establish any claim to this account and was awarded
nothing therefor.
9. The trial court specifically found Plaintiff's testimony
regarding the value of this camera to be incredible. App. A, pp.
13-14.
10. One of which was the chair Little Ed was sitting in
when he killed himself.
11. This is the gun cabinet Plaintiff's mother broke during
the 16 March 1994 disturbance.
12. One of these rugs was used to wrap Little Ed's body
when he was taken out of the home.
13. The trial court made no finding as to the disposition
of these rings, although Defendant Ed Francis specifically
-18-

c.

Still other items were fixtures attached to the Sigurd
home: fencing materials, the ceiling fan, curtains and
curtain rods, and an automatic coal feeder called a
stockermatic.

The court disallowed any recovery for

these items as well as items which were simply
unaccounted for: a box and receipts, electric toys,
five additional guns, and a gun rack.
Trial Transcript, pp. 176-216; 25J-76; 315-47.
30.

Raegan was hospitalized numerous times following 23 March
1994.

These hospitalizations included:

19 April 1994 (7

days), 26 April 1994 (6 days), 12 June 1994 (1 day), 14 June
1994 (1 day), and 22 June 1994 (2 days).

Raegan had a

normal delivery of a healthy child on 23 June 1994. The
April 26, 1994 hospitalization was in the psychiatric unit
of Mountain View Hospital.

With the exception of the 2 6

April 1994 Mountain View hospitalization, these related
primarily to her pregnancy.

See hospital records, admitted

at Trial as Plaintiff's Exhibits 7-16.
31.

Raegan's hospitalizations note her depressed state.

Each of

these hospitalizations note the guilt Raegan was feeling and
the hard feelings between her and the Defendants.

The

hospitalization immediately following the suicide of Little

testified that he
AJ Little Ed through his ring into the Sevier
River which was ad_ .cent to the Sigurd home and saw Raegan with
her ring during her deposition. Trial Transcript, pp. 344-45.
-19-

Ed is of central importance.

The doctor notes that Raegan

is "almost hysterical" and has feelings of guilt. However,
not one of these hospitalizations notes any distress over
the fight with Defendant Patricia Francis on 16 March 1994,
the funeral arrangements, or the alleged conversion.

These

allegations came later —after the lawsuit was filed.

Id.

App. D; App. E.
In between hospitalizations, Raegan managed to retain an
attorney.

A probate action was filed on 13 April 1994. She

was appointed personal representative of Little Ed's estate
by 19 April 1994, following her first hospitalization, and
prior to her second.

The present action was filed on 4 May

1994, two days after her discharge from Mountain View
Hospital.

See Court file.

At trial a licensed clinical social worker named Randy
Chesley testified.

Mr. Chesley works for the Central Utah

Mental Health/Substance Abuse Center.

He testified that

Raegan was severely depressed and referenced his medical
records, which note that the primary causes of her
depression were Little Ed's suicide and the shock at
discovering the bloody suicide scene although he does note
the ill feelings with Defendants, funeral arrangements, and
concerns over Little Ed's possessions. App. E; Trial
Transcript, pp. 220-21, 226-27.
April 1994 state:
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Mr. Chesley's notes of 4

The client reports that just over 2 weeks ago her
husband committed suicide by shooting himself with a
hunting rifle. She was the first to arrive at what was
an apparently very grizzly [sic] scene. She almost
immediately went into labor and was hospitalized for 5
days [sic] at Gunnison Valley Hospital. The labor
successfully abated. The client is blaming herself for
the suicide stating that she and her husband had
separated 36 hours earlier. She states that her inlaws have become very antagonistic toward her,
initially accusing her of murdering her husband and
later blaming her for his suicide. She reportedly was
not permitted to attend the funeral and is not being
given access to any of her husband [sic] possessions.
Notes attached hereto as Appendix E.14
34.

Mr. Chesley further noted that Plaintiff had been afflicted
with suicidal ideation since adolescence.

He noted that she

lived with her mother and her mother's eighth husband; that
one of her prior seven step-fathers had attempted to molest
her and that her older brother had molested her from age 10
to age 14. She became pregnant at age 15 and married Little
Ed at age 17. Mr. Chesley notes that the treatment
justification is "extreme symptoms of depression and anxiety
after the recent suicide death of her husband."

He notes

the two "work areas" to be "difficulty adjusting to the
extreme circumstances of the death of her husband" and
"trauma of having discovered husband."
35.

I&.

Mr. Chesley also testified that in his experience informing
a man that the paternity of his wife's unborn child was not

14. Mr. Chesley's notes were recieved into evidence at
trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 35. Trial Transcript, p. 225.
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his, would also be a severely upsetting event.

Indicating

that Raegan's remarks could certainly have played a role in
Little Ed's decision to take his life.

Trial Transcript,

pp. 227-29.
36.

At trial, Raegan sought recovery under three theories:
a.

First, Raegan sought recovery for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

While Raegan had no

clear theory as to exactly what actions by the
Defendants precipitated this severe emotional distress,
the trial court concluded that the exclusion of the
Plaintiff from the planning and execution of the
funeral, taking control of property, denying her
recognition as the spouse, was the conduct which was
outrageous and intolerable.
b.

Second, Raegan sought recovery for conversion of
personal property.

Raegan presented her evidence

regarding this conversion, primarily by reference to a
list attached hereto as Appendix F.

This document

listed items of property she believed were converted
and opposite of each item was a dollar amount
representing Raegan's guesstimate of value.15 As to
15. For clarity, it is not Defendant's claim that the trial
court erred in admitting such uninformed evidence as Raegan
presented, but that such evidence standing alone as it did,
cannot substitute for the required evidence of fair market value
or by itself provide any basis for the determination of fair
market value.
-22-

most of these items, Raegan testified that these
figures merely represented her uninformed opinion as to
worth.

In no instance did Raegan present testimony as

to the nature or condition of the item, its fair market
value, or any other specific information relative
thereto.16

Notwithstanding this lack of evidence

regarding fair market value, or information from which
fair market value might be deduced, the trial court
awarded Raegan the sum of $12,102.02 for conversion.
Third, Plaintiff also attempted to recover for "money
had and received."

Her claim in this regard was for

money she alleged contributed to the down payment of
the Sigurd home as well as $11,000 which she claimed
Little Ed used to purchase a vehicle which was retained
in the name of Defendants prior to their marriage.

The

court concluded that her burden of proof on these
claims had not been met explaining:
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as the
$11,000. This I will explain. In order for me to make
calculations about the $11,000 and its relationship to
the 198 6 GMC Jimmy, I need to know more about the
vehicle. I need to know such things as its purchase
price, its value as of March 18, 1994, its rental value

16. Appellants use the term "guesstimate" advisedly. The
trial court found that at least one of her values, regarding the
camera, was a mere guess, and rejected. App. A, Memorandum
Decision, pp. 13-14. A review of her testimony, however, shows
her valuation evidence to have been uniformily comprised of
hopeful guesses. Trial Transcript, pp. 176-216, 250-76.
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and its disposition since March 18, 1994.
information about these topics.
App. A, Memorandum Decision, p. 17.

I have no

The court

concluded that because there was insufficient
information regarding this matter, Plaintiff failed to
carry her burden of proof and accordingly refused
recovery on this claim.

App. A; Trial Transcript,

passim.
37.

The court entered judgement in favor of Plaintiff in the sum
of $23,050.26, which was calculated as follows:

The sum of

$12,102.0 for conversion, the sum of $7,500.00 for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the sum of
$3,348.24 for pre-judgement interest at the rate of 10% per
annum on the amount awarded for conversion from 18 March
1994 through 22 January 1997.

Finally the court awarded

post-judgement interest on the entire amount, $23,050.26,
from the date of the court's memorandum decision.

App. B.

Summary of Arguments
Plaintiff failed to show that any actions of the Defendant
were outrageous.

There was no finding and no evidence that any

action, outrageous or not, caused Plaintiff's emotional
disturbance nor was there evidence that Defendants directed any
behavior towards her. Accordingly, Plaintiff did not present
evidence necessary to sustain recovery for intentional infliction
-24-

of emotional distress and the judgment should therefore be
reverse.
Similarly, Plaintiff's evidence regarding conversion was
also wanting.

She failed to present any evidence of fair market

value or that she had made a demand for the return of her
property.

These failures preclude recovery.

Also she failed to

establish the property she claimed was taken was actually hers.
Again, there is insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment
granting recovery for conversion.

Having failed on both claims,

the judgment should be reversed in its entirety.

Argument
The issues in this appeal revolve around the two theories
upon which Plaintiff prevailed at trial: intentional infliction
of emotional distress and conversion.

These issues will be

discussed separately.

I.

Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Recover Any Damages for
Emotional Distress
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has actually
suffered sever emotional distress, which distress was actually
and proximately caused by the acts of the defendant; that the
defendant ^~ted, either intentionally or recklessly, for the
purpose of causing emotional distress, which act was directed
-25-

towards plaintiff; and which act is extreme, outrageous, and
intolerable in that it offended generally accepted standards of
decency and morality.

Retherford v. AT&T, 842 P.2d 967, 975-76,

977 n.19 (Utah 1992); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, I n c . 842
P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347
(Utah 1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

A.

Outrageous?:
Does Defendants' Behavior Make the
Reasonable Person Exclaim "Outrageous"?

The first issue on appeal, a mixed question of law and fact,
is whether the Defendants' actions were sufficiently shocking to
support recover for the tort.

The trial court's memorandum

decision does not analyze what it considered outrageous, or make
any comparison to generally accepted standards of decency and
morality-

Rather, the court concludes that the Defendants'

behavior was outrageous in three respects: first, in excludion
her from the funeral planning and execution; second, in failing
to mention Raegan; and third, in allegedly converting property.
None of these acts are outrageous in the sense required to
support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Outrageous actions are those which offend "the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality."
P.2d at 977 n.19.

Retherford, 844

In determining outrageousness, the Utah courts
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have referred freely to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46,
cmt. d (1965), which provides that the required conduct is
"behavior so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency."

The Restatement

further provides that only behavior "in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment aaainst the actor and lead him to explain "outrageous"
provides a suificient basis upon which to predicate recovery.
Id.

The Retherford court explained that only behavior which

constitutes "extraordinarily vile conduct," conduct that is
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" is
sufficient to constitute a predicate for recovery.

Retherford,

844 P.2d at 977 n.19.
Assume17 all of the bad behavior presented by Plaintiff to
have been true as marshalled in the statement of facts: Assume
uhe was wrestled to the ground on 16 March 1994 by Little Ed's
105 lb. mother.

Assume the Defendants hated her and blamed her

for Little Ed's death.

Assume that Defendants excluded her from

the funeral service and deliberately failed to include her in
either obituary.
her property.

Assume that they wrongfully excluded her from

Given the surrounding circumstances, the death of

Little Ed, Plaintiff's own behavior, the emotions, the problems,

17. In other words, for the purposes of this section,
assume all the facts as Plaintiff alleged or testified or which
otherwise support the judgment.
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the anger, can it be fairly said that these action cause the
average person to exclaim outrageous?

The reaction to reading

these facts is more fairly characterized as pity than outrage.
If so, Plaintiff's judgment for intentional infliction of
emotional distress should be reversed.
Reviewing these facts separaely shows even more clearly the
deficiency in the court's rationale.

Given the feelings between

Plaintiff and Defendants, not mixing at the funeral seems the
soul of discretion, not an outrageous act.18

Far better to keep

these parties separated than allow them to again reach critical
mass in a circumstance as emotional as the funeral.

This is not

extreme, but reasonable.
Excluding Raegan from mention in the obituaries presumes
that Defendants had a duty to speak regarding Raegan.19
was no such duty nor should one be imposed.

There

Moreover, Plaintiff

was able to obtain public recognition through her own effort in
getting Mr. Springer to publish a second obituary and by the
public probate filing.

Plaintiff was not the only one to suffer

18. It is somewhat difficult to understand how Plaintiff
was excluded by the Defendants from the funeral. She gave them
permission to proceed and was not released from the hospital
until the day after the funeral. Statement of Facts, 11 22, 28;
App. D; Trial Transcript, pp. 88-91, 102-09.
19. Such a finding implicates free speech concerns, because
it would amount to compelling Defendant's to speak on pain of
civil liability. Such is not the role of this tort, nor should
it be the policy of this State. But cf., App. A, p. 15 ("They
denied her any recognition as the decedent's spouse.").
-28-

a loss in this case; Defendants were themselves distraught over
the loss of their son and very upset wit. Plaintiff.
not wish to recognize her.

They did

This is behavior which occurs in

families, tragically, every day.

Such behavior is neither

extreme or outrageous.
The conversion is a separate tort for which Plaintiff has
sought recovery.

The trial court appears to have concluded that

the mere conversion was sufficient to sustain recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.20 When Defendants
entered the house to clean it out, they carefully separated
property they believed was theirs from property they believed was
Plaintiff's.

Plaintiff's property was placed in storage and

never again touched.

This indicated a careful regard

for

Plaintiff's property rights, not an extreme or outrageous
disregard for them.21
Even assuming these events occurred in the manner in which
the Plaintiff claims, it is impossible to say that they are
singly or in concert so utter vile, so malignant, so far beyond
the realm of civilized behavior, as to make the reasonable person
exclaim outrageous.

Because the behavior complained of is not,

20. App. A, Memorandum Decision, p. 15 ("They took control
of her property anddid with it as they pleased.")
21. For the purpose of this section of the brief, assume
Defendant's action constituted conversion. Even if a conversion
occurred, its occurrence was such that no outrageous acts or acts
intended to cause any emotional distress happened.
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on any objective measure, outrageous, the judgment regarding
emotional distress should be reversed.

B.

There Was No Evidence to Establish Causation and
Therefore the Judgment Should Be Reversed

The second issue is the issue of causation.

Of course,

proof of proximate cause is essential to Plaintiff's intentional
infliction claim.

Samms, 358 P.2d at 347.

In this case, the

trial court made no finding of proximate or actual cause and
there is no evidence from which proximate cause could reasonably
be found.

To the contrary, the evidence, even viewed most

favorably to the judgment, is that Little Ed's suicide and
finding Little Ed's body actually and proximately caused
Plaintiff's emotional trauma.
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause),
produces the injury and without which the result would have never
occurred.

It is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily

sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-247 (Utah 1985),
quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah 1984), as
cited in Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) .
Often a difficulty in claims of infliction of emotional
distress is pinpointing the time the severe emotional distress
-30-

occurred,

Retherford,. 844 P.2d at 975-76.

In evaluating the

nature and causes, actual and proximate, of emotional distress,
pinpointing the time of accrual is essential.
did not identify or analyze when this di

The trial court

ess occurred.

Fortunately, however, the record allows a precise time to be
determined.
In the present case Plaintiff suffered severe emotional
distress on 18 March 1994 when she found Little Ed's body.22

In

response to this acute distress she had immediate physical
manifestations, including premature labor.

In response to this

distress she immediately and promptly checked herself in to the
hospital.

In response to this distress she had several

subsequent hospitalizations.
Defendants did not cause the death of Little Ed.
took his own life.

Little Ed

Guilt over her behavior towards Little Ed was

the primary cause of Plaintiff's emotional distress.

Plaintiff's

medical records and the medical testimony presented at trial
amply demonstrate this.

See Statement of Facts, 11 33-34.

Plaintiff suffered as a result of seeing the scene of her
deceased husband's body and the trauma that scene naturally

22. Plaintiff claimed to have been battered and cuckolded
by Little Ed, but never reported this to any medical or law
enf cement personnel, notwithstanding many opportunities. She
fou
with Little Ed and his parents, was present for other
suiw-ie attempts by Little Ed, had Little Ed deny her access to
her property and money on 16 March 1994, but made no complaints
of emotional disturbance between Little Ed's tragic suicide.
-31-

entailed.

Defendants played no role in setting this scene,23

Plaintiff also suffered emotional distress as a result of having
lost her husband and being left husbandless and with two children
to care for.

Id.

Proximate cause is the cause which in natural and continuous
sequence produces the alleged injury and without which the injury
would not have occurred.

Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676.

In this

case, without the death of Little Ed, Plaintiff would not have
suffered severe emotional distress.

But for Little Ed's death,

Plaintiff would not have suffered any emotional distress; his
suicide was the actual

cause

of her distress.

Equally

significant, it is Little Ed's suicide and the death scene and
her immediate reaction thereto which was the substantial, if not
exclusive, cause of her emotional trauma.

She immediately went

into premature labor; she had a hard time breathing immediately.
She reacted with shock and fright and two hours later at the
hospital, the doctor noted that she was still "nearly
hysterical."

Little Ed's death was thus the event which, in a

natural and continuous sequence, caused Plaintiff's emotional
distress.

Little Ed's suicide and her view of the scene were the

actual and proximate causes of Plaintiff's distress.24
23. Plaintiff played a significant role in causing this
scene herself. She testified that the purpose of her comment
regarding paternity was to cause Little Ed to become upset.
24.
Assuming any of the events prior to 18 March 1994 caused any
-32-

It is curious to note that the memorandum decision provides
no finding of fact or facts to support a finding of causation on
causation.

The court merely recites the standard for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and merely states that "the
standard has been met". App. A, Memorana^in Decision, p. 15. The
trial court then recites the actions of the Defendants and
concludes that there conduct was "outrageous and intolerable" and
offensive to "some of the most highly prized of our societies
values."

The trial court merely concludes, without any

subsidiary facts, that "Plaintiff suffered emotional distress by
the hands of Defendants."

The Court does not disclose any fact

relating to causation or which demonstrates any causal nexus at
all between the actions the Court concludes are outrageous and
the severe emotional distress which Plaintiff concededly
suffered.25

Having failed to establish the necessary causal

emotional distress whatsoever, Little Ed's death is
unmistakablely a significant intervening cause of Plaintiff's
distress. Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677. As to events following
the death, the record is quite clear that without Little Ed's
dec n, no emotional distress of any kind would have occured.
Little Ed's death, grievously unforeseeable to anyone, was the
cause —perhaps an intervening cause— of Plaintiff's distress.
Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rfiin & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
25. In drafting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it
is incumbent that the Court disclose sufficient facts to allow
the reviewing court to ascertain the analysis the Court went
through. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 901 (Utah 1996);
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995); Acton v. J.B.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In the present case the
Court has not done so. There are no Findings of Fact sufficient
-33-

link, and having failed to present any evidence of one, the
judgment respecting intentional infliction of emotional distress
should be reversed.

CLX. Defendant Had No Intent to Cause Plaintiff Any Harm
Finally, proof of intentional or reckless behavior is
necessary to support a finding of intentional of emotional
distress.

It is not merely behavior which is intentional but

behavior which is intentionally or recklessly directed towards
the Plaintiff for the purpose of causing the Plaintiff emotional
distress which must be proven.

Samms, 358 P.2d at 347.

In the present case this standard has not been met.
Defendants undertook certain actions.

Plaintiff and Defendant

Patricia Francis had a physical altercation on the 16th of March
prior to the death of Little Ed.

Following Little Ed's death,

Defendants1 removed property from the Sigurd home. In planning
the funeral, following consultation with the Plaintiff,
Defendants made funeral arrangements.

Defendant Ed Francis said

Little Ed was divorced at the time of his death and therefore
Raegan was not mentioned in the obituary in the Salina Sun.
Defendants made it clear that they did not wish Plaintiff's
presence at the funeral.

Finally, Plaintiff testified that she

called the Defendants' home and spoke with Defendants daughter,
to allow a determination of how the Court concluded causation was
met.
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Teresa, who told her not to call there ever again.26

None of

these actions were taken with the intent or with reckless
disregard for the likelihood of causing Plaintiff any emotional
distress.
The physical altercation was simply that: a reaction to the
Plaintiff's own aggressive behavior.

Clearly the funeral

arrangements were taken as a result of the Defendants own
understandable grief.

Defendants believed, not without some

basis in fact and logic, that Plaintiff's own ill-considered
statements to Little Ed caused him to take his own life.
Accordingly, they did not wish her presence at the funeral, in
their home or in their lives. However, there is no evidence that
these actions were taken with the intent of causing her any
emotional distress.
their own grief.

These actions were taken by Defendant in

Plaintiff did not establish that these actions

were in any way directed towards her or reckless with regard to
her.

II. Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Elements of a Conversion.

26. Holding Defendants responsible in any way for this
comment by Teresa or Teresa's publication of the Provo Herald
obituary is simply contrary to any just imposition of liability.
The undisputed te3timony was that neither Defendants nor the
funeral home director, Mr. Springer, had any involvement in the
publication of the Provo Herald obituary. Statement of Facts, 1
24; Trial Transcript, pp. 102-08, 340-51.
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In this case the trial court improperly awarded Plaintiff
damages for an alleged conversion of personal property.

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that "a conversion is an act of wilful
interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by
which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and
possession."

Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958).

In the present case the trial court made three errors with
respect to its award of damages for alleged conversion.

These

errors are: (1) a failure to require the appropriate type of
proof of loss by the Plaintiff;

(2) failure to require Plaintiff

to demonstrate that a demand for the return of her property had
been made; and (3) the failure of Plaintiff to demonstrate that
all of the property she was claiming was actually hers.

A.

Plaintiff Provided No Evidence or Proof of Fair Market
Value

In the present action Plaintiff failed to present any
evidence whatsoever of fair market value.

In Utah,"[a]s a

general rule, the measure of damages for the conversion of
property is the value of the property at the time of conversion
plus interest."

Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527,

531 (Utah 1993); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1961).
"And, furthermore, that proof of the value of the converted
property is essential to recovery of damages on the theory of
conversion."

Lowe, 364 P.2d at 421; Lym v. Tompson, 184 P.2d
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667, 670 (Utah 1947); Kniahton y. Manning, 33 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah
1934).

In the present case no evidence of fair market value was

presented.

Plaintiff consistantly testified as to her opinion or

guess as to value or more commonly Plaintiff testified as to the
expense she and her late husband expended in purchasing such
item.

See Statement of Facts 1 29; Trial Tranascript, pp. 176-

216, 250-76. As to many other items, which were either owned by
the Defendants or gifts from the Defendants, Plaintiff was wholly
unable to give any value other than her own uninformed opinion.
In no instance did Plaintiff testify as to the condition, nature,
type or extent of property she lost.

Plaintiff simply provided

no evidence of fair market value nor any evidence from which fair
market value could be fairly deduced.
Plaintiff's testimony regarding the allegedly converted guns
is typical.

Plaintiff testified that her deceased husband owned

ten guns at the time of his death.27

She was unable to testify

as to their manufacturer, caliber, whether they were rifles,
shotguns or pistols, their make, age, or condition.

In fact,

upon cross examination Plaintiff explicitly testified that she
believed any gun to have an average v .ue of $400.00 and simply

27. In contrast, Defendant Ed Francis testified that Little
Ed owned one guns at his death, a Rossi .22 pump action. He had
possession of a few others belonging to his father, namely, the
.30-30 used for the suicide, Browning 20 gauge shotgun, a
Remington Model 870 shotgun, a Stevens .410 single shot shotgun,
and a Winchester .270 bolt action rifle. Trial Transcript, pp.
338-39.
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arrived at her valuation of the guns by that average value.
Plaintiff further testified that she had never purchased a gun,
had never been present when a gun was purchased, had never sold a
gun and had never had any experience whatsoever with guns.
Plaintiff's evidence of value was simply nonexistent.28
Predicating recovery upon such evidence is simply wrong.

This

error should be corrected and the judgment reversed.
Market value is "the price for which an article is bought
and sold and for which there exists a demand in the market place
and the legal definition of that price is retail not wholesale."
Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978).
28. One of the trial court's findings was that "[a] local
automobile dealer testified that [Defendant] Edward M. [Francis]
sold him a rifle for $400.00." App. A, Memorandum Decision, p.
8. This transaction occured in November, 1994, many months after
the events of this lawsuit and was unconnected with any of the
parties other than Defendant Ed Francis. However, this
transaction did occur, as part of a trade. Notably, the trade,
and Mr. Larsen's testimony specifically identify the gun involved
in the trade, a Smith & Wesson Model 1700 .30-06 hunting rifle.
The dealer described it as a common hunting weapon with no
special features. Trial Transcript, pp. 147-49. This gun
actually belonged to John Ore, the Defendants' son-in-law, and he
asked Defendant Ed Francis to trade it on his behalf. Trial
Transcript, pp. 242-43. In another transaction, Defendant Ed
Francis gave Little Ed and Raegan $400.00 for a handgun. She
testified that this money was actually paid, but nevertheless
seeks recovery for that gun. Trial Transcript, pp. 57-58.
Pretending that these two transactions support the
Plaintiff's proposition that therefore all guns are worth an
average of $400.00 is ludicrous. It is like arguing that because
one might buy a 1988 Porsche for $20,000, and then buy a 1995
Oldsmobile for $20,000, that therefore a particular 1979 Pontiac
is also worth $20,000. Such evidence would not support a finding
regarding the fair market value of the automobiles and yet that
is exactly the evidenc% the trial court accepted. These types of
sales transactions are hardly fungible.
-38-

It is significant that in other cases where the Court has
considered what constitutes fair market value, the Court has been
presented with evidence from appraisers or persons knowledgeable
in the field of the particular item in question.
586 P.2d at 454.

Cf. Winters,

In this case, no knowledge or expertise was

presented; only uninformed, self-serving, inflated29 statements.
In the case in question, Plaintiff's evidence of value
failed notably.

There was no basis for the Court to determine

any of the fair market value of any of the items claimed by the
Plaintiff.

The only evidence of value presented by the Plaintiff

were mere guesses.30

Yet, evidence of fair market value is

29. Plaintiff attempted to claim that a camera was worth
$2,500.00. She testified as follows:
Q:
[By Mr. Taylor] Item No. 37 is a — is an expensive 35
millimeter camera, with lenses and bag; is that an
item, or are those items that Little Ed had before the
marriage?
A:
Yes. They were.
•

*

*

Q:
A:

Why such a high value on it, Raegan? $2,500?
Because a lens is very expensive. He had a whole bunch
of lenses in it. . . .
Q:
What was the make of the camera?
A:
I don't know.
Trial Transcript, pp. 199-200. She further testified that she
did not know whether the camera was German or Japanese or
American. Xsi* at 269. Later, Defendant Ed Francis testified
that he purchased the camera for Little Ed at a pawn shop in
Payson for $50.00. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's
testimony regarding the camera was not credible. App. A, pp. 1314. However, the remarkable point is that the testimony
Plaintiff gave about the camera was no different than all the
rest of her conversion testimony. It was fundamentally the same.
30. It is interesting
Defendant's were able to pla

note in many instances when
a value on particular items of
-39-

necessary to sustain a conversion claim.
evidence is a mortal flaw.

Failure of such

In this case, there was no evidence

of fair market value and no evidence from which such value could
be gleaned.

There being no evidence to sustain the judgment, it

should be reversed.

B.

Having Failed to Make Any Demand for the Return of
Property, Plaintiff's Conversion Action Will Not Lie

Before a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for
conversion, there must be a demand for the return of the
allegedly converted property.
102 (Utah 1934).

Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100,

Cf. General Leasing Co. v. Manifest Corp., 667

P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1983); Heiselt Const. Co. v. Garff. 225 P.2d
720, 721 (Utah 1950).

In this action, no demand was ever made by

the Plaintiff for the return of her property.
Under Utah law "conversion consists either in the
appropriation of a thing to the party's own use and beneficial
enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over
it, in exclusion or defiance of owner's right, or in withholding
possession of the property from the owner under a claim of title
inconsistent with his own."

Christensen, 36 P.2d at 102.

In the

property, the Court almost invariably accepted the Defendant's
valuation rather than the Plaintiffs, tending to show that the
Court generally disbelieved or at least disfavored the
Plaintiff's testimony. See, e.g., Memorandum Decision, page
numbers 10, 13, items numbers 4, 5, 18, 30, 35, 37, 42, 47, 49,
56 and 60. Attached as Appendix A.
-40-

present case, much of the property Plaintiff claims was converted
was actually held by the Defendants in a storage unit.

This

indicates not an intent to destroy or to exercise dominion or
control for their own beneficial use, but to hold it pending the
resolution of the dispute; to hold it for Plaintiff's benefit.
On March 18, 1994, when Little Ed shot himself, the house
needed to be cleaned immediately.

The Plaintiff had left the

premises without speaking with the Defendants and had herself
checked into the hospital.

There was

ill will between the

Defendants and Plaintiff, stemming from the fight which the
Defendants had witnessed the evening previous to Little Ed's
suicide and as a result of the Plaintiff's quite unjustified
assertion that her unborn child was not Little Ed's. Leaving the
house uncleaned was out of the question.
themselves to have the house cleaned.

Defendants took it upon

Given the situation and

their ownership of the house, this was not an unreasonable step.
They commenced to clean out the house.

Some items such as

the refrigerator, mattresses and beds were held in storage for
Plaintiff to recover at her request -a request which never came.
Other items were clearly owned by the Defendants such as the guns
and were disposed of by them.31

Yet other items were apparently

worthless and were disposed of by giving them to various persons.

31. In an insight into the Defendant's grief, Defendant Ed
Francis meant to dispose of all his guns and did so by throughing
them to the bottom of Fish Lake. Trial Transcript, pp. 339-40.
-41-

For example the chair in which Little Ed was seated when he
committed suicide and the broken gun cabinet were given to the
individual who cleaned the house.

Again, not an unreasonable

procedure.
At the time this cleaning commenced, Plaintiff had abandoned
the property; she did not intend to return.
Decision, p. 17.

App. A, Memorandum

She had not paid rent for the month of March,

1994 and was absent and Defendants did not know when or if she
would return.

When one is absent without notice to the landlord

from premises for more than 15 days without the payment of rent,
and there is no sign of occupancy other than the presence of
personalty in the premises, an abandonment is presumed.
Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3) (a) (1996).
abandoned.
point.

Utah

The property was presumed

Without a demand, no conversion could occur at that

Christensen, 36 P.2d at 102.

Defendants put Plaintiff's

property in storage and were served with a Complaint.
Many of the items which Plaintiff seeks recovery for were
simply not in the house when the Defendant's cleaned it up.

For

example, alarm clocks, the baby crib, bunk beds, laundry baskets,
oil lamps, lantern, lamp shade, children's toys, safety gate,
records, cassettes, video tapes, were all gone by the time the
Plaintiff entered the premises.

The only reasonable explanation

for this discrepancy presented to the Court is that these are the
items Little Ed took to the dump the day before his suicide.
trial court simply ignored this information and in conjunction
-42-

The

with its other erroneous rulings regarding the value of the items
simply assessed damages for such items against the Defendants.
Plaintiff had some obligation to affirmative seek the return
of property she believed to be hers prior to the commencement of
an action.

She did not.

She abandoned the premises and in

cleaning the premises, Defendants segregated the property which
appeared to be Plaintiffs and held it. Absent a demand under
those circumstances, Plaintiff's conversion action will not lie.
The judgment should therefore be reversed.

Request for Oral Argument
Because of the fact-intensive nature of this case and its
wider legal significance regarding the law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and conversion,
Defendants/Appellants respectfully request that oral arguments be
held in this matter and that the court issue a fully-reasoned
opinion.

Conclusion
This case is about tragedy and the loss of a loved one.

It

is tragic for all involved and all the more tragic because it has
moved into the courts at all.

There was no outrageous behavior

by the Defendants which caused any distress for the Plaintiff.
She was distressed, and understandably so, by the view her eyes

-43-

beheld on the morning of 18 March 1994.
her distress.

That was the cause of

She should not recover anything against the

Defendants.
Plaintiff has failed to adequate demonstrate her conversion
cause of action.
insubstantial.
demand.

Her evidence has been unsatisfactory and

There is no evidence of fair market value or of

She should recover nothing of the Defendants for

conversion either.
The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate her case and the
trial court went awry.

This Court should restore the balance and

bring closure to a painful episode.

The judgment should be

reversed.
DATED this ^ ^

day of November, 1997.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

By: ^<Z^t^^

^^^c^4r-

Brad C. Smith

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing document
was mailed by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this «s^> day of
November, 1997, to the following:
Marcus Taylor
Attorney at Law
175 N. Main
Richfield, UT 84701
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURTS

DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY , UTAH
895 East 300 North
Richfield, UT 84701
Telephone: 801-896-2700 Ftx: 801-896-8047

RAEGAN D ANIELLE FRANCIS,
individually and in her capacity as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Edward
Kenneth Francis,

DECISION
Cast No. 940600116

Plainti£

AJBigned Judge: DAVtU L. MUWfcK

vs.

EDWARD M. FRANCIS and PATRICIA
BLUNDON FRANCIS,
Defendants.
!

This case was tried to the Court without a jury, in Richfield, Utah on November 14, 1996.
The parties were present with counsel, Mr. Taylor for the plaintiff; Mr. Kunz and Mr. Smith for
the defendants. At the conclusion of the trial, the matter was taken under advisement.

This case had it's beginning some 40 years ago when the defendants, Edward M. Francis
and Patricia Blundon, were married. In the course of their lives together, Mr. and Mrs. Francis
had 3 children, Thomas Edward Francis, Theresa Rebecca Ore and Edward Kenneth Francis.
Edward Kenneth is now deceased, but his life was, at one time, connected with that of the
plaintiff The facts which will be described herein gaveriseto the complaint which the plaintiff
KM30LW
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -2made.
1.

Edward K. was born on November 8,1968 in Belie Fourch, South Dakota. He graduated
from Payson High School, Payson, Utah, in 1986. He died at his own hand on March 18,
1994. During his lifetime he suffered from a disability called Mild Spastic Cerebral Palsy
of the left side.

2.

In July of 1993, Edward K. became acquainted with the plaintiff, Raegan Harris.* At the
time she was a young lady of about 17 years of age. She had never been married. Edward
K. had been married once, but was divorced. Raegan had a 1-year-old daughter. Edward
K. had no children. He had lived in Payson, Utah County, Utah during his first marriage.

3.

Edward K. and Raegan began dating. He bought a diamond ring for $299.97 on August
25, 1993 and gave it to her.

4.

They became intimate. She became pregnant by him on September 11,1993.

5.

On November 12,1993 Edward K. and Raegan were married. They resided in Raegan**

I note that the death certificate contains two possible emx* which may be of interest. The death
certificate was received in evidence as exhibit #3. Blank #9 contained therein shows the nsmo of ihc
surviving spouse. Blank #17 shows the namootfthc decedent's father. Doth names are probably
misspelled The plaintiff never did tell the Court at trial how to spell her name, but I note that her
pleadings list her name with the spelling Raegan, while the death certificate apclli it Regan.
At the trial the defendant Edward M. told me that hianarae was Edward Me]vin Francis. The death
certificate refer* to him as Edward K. Francis, Sr.
It has been my experience that these type of spelling errors and inconsistencies arc the bone of
genealogists and record keepers. If the parties are inclined to makechanges.it would be easier todo
so now rather than later.
mm\M
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page ~3parents* home until after Christmas of 1993, then lived in Edward M and Patricia's home.
6.

While living in Raegan's parents' home, Edward K. became despondent and threatened
suicide with a handgun that he owned. Racgan called Edward M , who came and took the
gun.

7.

Both Raegan and Edward K had accumulated certain items of personal property before
November 12, 1993.

8.

Raegan owned a 1979 Chevrolet Impala automobile for which she had paid $2,000.00 and
against which there was an $800.00 lien to the seller. Edward K. owned a Suzuki Samurai
sport-utility vehicle. Edward K. also owned a horse trailer.

9.

Edward K. received a monthly disability check from Social Security. For a time, he was
employed as a carpet layer. For a time, Raegan worked as a waitress.

10.

In November of 1993, Edward K. sold the Suzuki and the horse trailer for $11,000.00. He
and Raegan gave that money to Edward M. and Patricia. They used that money and some
other money and property of their own to purchase vehicles, one of which was a 1986
GMC Jimmy sport-utility. It was titled in defendants' names, but Edward K and Raegan
had exclusive use and possession of it.

11.

After living with Edward K/s parents for a time, they (the parents) decided to assist the
young people in the purchase of a home.

12.

Edward K. paid the lien against the 1979 Chevrolet, and then it was sold for $1,200.00. Of
M1I301J*
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -4that money, $1,050.00 was given to Edward M. to help toward the down payment on the
home.
13.

Edward M agreed to buy the handgun that he had taken from Edward K The purchase
price was to be $400.00, if the money was used as part of the down payment on the home.

14.

The home was purchased by the defendants* The monthly payment was to be $314.00. If it
was paidfaithfullyby Edward K. and Raegan, then they would become the owners at the
end of the purchase contract. The young family moved into the home on January 19,1994.

15.

Edward K. and Raegan paid for the utilities. The account with Utah Power & Light was in
Patricia's name.

16.

They purchased a refrigerator on January 19,1994.

17.

They purchased an entertainment center on January 26, 1994.

18.

They made a trip to Ernst Home & Nursery in Spanish Fork, Utah on March 11,1994.
They purchased $500.00-worth of fencing materials and gardening and yard maintenance
items.

19.

A fence was installed at the home.

20.

Others items were purchased and installed in the home, such as a ceiling fan, curtains and
curtain rods.

21.

Edward K and Raegan probably had a rather unstable relationship, with periods of
happiness interspersed with periods of stress and unhappiness. Raegan said that Edward
Ml 1191M
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K, hit her on more than one occasion. Raegan threatened to leave several times. Edward
K. was unfaithful to Raegan.
22.

In any event, on Wednesday, March 16,1994 a series of events commenced which led to a
portion of the claims made in this case. On that date, Raegan had determined to terminate
the relationship with Edward K. and had begun packing and arranging her things to be
moved out of the home. During the course of the morning, Edward K called his parents
and Raegan called her parents, Bill and Connie Allred of Aurora, Utah, all of whom
eventually arrived.

23.

Raegan called 911. A deputy sheriff arrived on the scene at the request of the dispatcher.
He later left and then, after some time had passed, other law enforcement officials
appeared including the sheriff. All of the non-police people engaged in shouting, namecalling and threatening. Eventually, the situation was brought to a conclusion and Raegan
left with her parents and with a few items of personal property. As she was walking away,
Raegan said to Edward K., "You're not the father!"

24.

Later in the evening Raegan called Edward K. and the two met and went for a ride. They
talked about resolving their differences. She told him that he was the father of the child.
Raegan stayed with Edward K. at the Sigurd home where they talked all night. In the
morning of the 17th it became clear to Raegan that they would not resolve their
differences. At about 10:00 AM Raogan took off her wedding rings, gave them to Edward
Nit*}*
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -6K , and asked him to take her to her parents' home, which he did.
25.

Later that day Edward K. spoke with his father, who went to the Sigurd home where he
gave Edward K. a sleeping pill. The two visited for a time.

26.

On March 18, 1994 Raegan traveledfromher mother's home in Aurora to the family
home in Sigurd. She arrived at about 11:00 a.m. Finding thefrontdoor locked, she went
around to the back, entered the home and called Edward K.'s name and received no
response. As she looked through the home she eventually discovered his remains in the
living room. He had apparently committed suicide.

27.

A neighbor arrived because he had heard the fatal shot. Raegan called Patricia and then
called 911. Law enforcement officials arrived. Raegan was distraught and went to stay at
the neighbor's home. The defendants arrived.

28.

Tom Jensen was one of the policemen. He found Edward K/s wallet. It contained
$515.00. He later gave the wallet and its contents to Edward M.

29.

Raegan was admitted to the Gunnison Valtey Hospital in Gunnison, Utah on March 18,
1994 at 1:00 PM. She was discharged and left the hospital on March 23, 1994.

30.

In the meantime, Edward M. and Patricia arranged for funeral services. The services were
conducted on March 22, 1994 in Salina, Utah. The funeral was directed by
Springer/Turner Funeral Home. A printed program was used at the services. Raegan did
not attend.
MI m i *
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -731.

One of the owners of the funeral home is Mr, Joe Springer, who testified at trial that he
arranged to have the program printed and to have the obituaries published. He followed
the directions given to him by Edward M. in preparing the program, and in preparing the
obituaries, which were to be published in the local newspaper, the Salina Sun, and in the
Daily Herald, a newspaper published in Provo, Utah County, Utah.

32.

Raegan's name does not appear in the funeral program, nor does it make any reference to
the decedent's marital or parental status. Raegan's name did not appear in either obituary.

33.

On March 19 or 20,1994, defendants* lawyer called Raegan in the hospital and then
Edward M. called. In essence, he said, "The funeral has been arranged. You can't come."

34.

Later during the hospital stay, Raegan called Edward M.'s home to inquire about the
status of her personal property. She spoke to Theresa. Theresa told her never to call there
again.

35.

Raegan went to the Sigurd home on March 24,1994. She didn't go inside, but looked
through a window. She could see items of personal property.

36.

Within a few days of the funeral, defendants retrieved all the items of personal property
from the home. They have had the exclusive possession and use thereof until the present
day. Some has been converted to their own use and some has been in a storage unit in
Payson, Utah.

37.

Raegan's mother happened to drive by defendants9 home in Salina. They were having a
MtlttlJt
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -8yard sale. The mother thought she recognized some of Raegan's things there, so she had a
friend go and make some purchases. Thefriendreturned with some of Raegan's property - pots, pans, and towels.
38.

A local automobile dealer testified that Edward M. sold him ariflefor $400.00.

39.

On April 19, 1994, Raegan was appointed by this Court to serve as the personal
representative of Edward K.'s estate.

40.

Raegan has been hospitalized as follows:
a.

March 18, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 5 days;

b.

April 19, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 7 days;

c.

April 26,1994, Mountain View Hospital, 6 days;

d.

June 12,1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 1 day, false labor,

e.

June 1S, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 1 day, false labor,

f.

June 22,1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 2 days, where Raegan was delivered of a
baby girl on June 23, 1994.

41.

I have used a word processing table as a means not only to list the items of property that
are at issue in this case but also to indicate the Court's decisions as to source, location and
value. These explanatory notes may be helpful in understanding the table.
a.

The table contains several columns. Each column has a descriptive phrase or word
at the top. Two of those words require explanation. The word "source** means
final *
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -9"Nam© of the person who brought the item into the relationship." Each of the
table cells under the heading "source" contains one of 4 alphabetic characters, E,
R, M or U. The letter "E" refers to Edward K. The letter "R" refers to Raegan.
The letter "M" means that the item was acquired during the marriage. The letter
"IT means Unknown."
b.

The word "location** means the location or disposition of the item as of the date of
trial. Each of the cells under this heading contains one of 4 alphabetic characters,
P, D, H or U- The letter "P" means "in the defendants' possession or control at a
storage unit in Pay son, Utah.** The letter "D** means "in the defendants* possession
or control.'* The letter "H*' means "in the Sigurd home.'* The letter "U** means
"location unknown."

c.

The values shown are intended to be values as of March 18,1994. In the
"Defendants' Value" column many items are shown with a value of "$0.00," This
moans one of two things. Either the defendants failed to give a value for a
particular item or affirmatively alleged its value to be zero.

d.

Some items on the list were installed in the home and became part of it. In those
instances I have shown the location to be "H" and the value to be "$0.00" to
indicate that plaintiff will be awarded no interest therein.

Mil*!*

P.1U

ID

jlHN ^ .

d7

L

^

Nu niil

p 11

DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -10! Description

#

1
1 ! Lawn mower
12
u—
J3
{A)

| Tiller
j.
!CB radio
j Tools, red toolbox, case

Yt) \ Fenang (railroad ties,
|
j wire (12 rolls @ $27),
gates, supplies)

|. 1.
6

1
!

E

Pillows (6)

Defendants' Plaintiffs
Court's
Value j Value 1 Value

M

i

P

[

$0.00

$179 00 !

$179 00 j

[ M

L

p

i

$000

$140 00

$140 00

E

D

j

$000 !

$130001

$13000 |

1E

D

$25 00 i S1.000.00J

$25.00 I

A!

j
j
|

H

M

.,

1

$0 00

$1120000

$0 00 j

1

E

D

$1000

$90 00

$90.00

j
1

R
R

D

$0 00

$300 00

$300 00 j

D

$0 00

$144 00

$144 00 j

•

R

| Barbecue

| 7 | Blankets (10)
I 8 ! Sheets (6 sets)

T

1 Source 1 Location

r

$0.00

$20.001

D

$0.00

$120.00J

$20.00 |

hoi

Afghans (3)

M

tii

Comforter

M

D

$0.00

$39.991

$39.99 |

I 12 ; Mattresses (2 full size)

M

D

$0.00

$150.00!

$150.00 1

1 13 Mattresses (2 twin size)

M

P

$0 00

$80 00!

$80 00 |

1 H Night stand

E

P

$0 00

$20 0 0 |

$20 00 j

! 15 Wooden box and receipts

U

U

$0.00

$0 00|

$0.00 I

Sterling silverware set (40
piece)

R

D

$0.00

$400.001
1i

$400.00 !
1j

Alarm clocks (2)

E

D

$0.00

$28.00]

$28.00

Safe (metal fireproof)

E

D

$50 00

$150 00'

$50 00

M

P

$0.00

. _$14:°?I

?J 4 0 0

|

1 6

1 17

:

[19 i Shovel, hoe, 2 rakes

$120.00

WllSOlJt
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[20

P

Description

Source

Location

Coolers (2)

E

D

M

D

Utah Independent Bank
account

j®

Money in wallet

r

Ball-shaped bank (like a
piggy bank), 5 gallon
capacity, containing coins

23
|24
25
j 26

|
;

Defendants'! Plaintiffs
Value j Value
$0.001
|

$2,000.00

1

|.

Court's
Value

$14.00

1

$14.00

$2r500.0oT

$0.00 1

1

1

i_

j

M

D

$515,00

$1.700.00 j

$515.00 !

E/M

D

$57.00

$100.00 i

$100.00 i

' 1

1

i

1

1

1

I
$69.00}

f

1
$0.00 |

Ceiling fan

M

H

$0.00

Cutting block table

M

D

$0.00

$120.00J

$120.00

Microwave

M

P

$0.00

$109.00|

$109.00 j

1

h

M

P

$0.00

128 Refrigerator

M

P

$0.00

$562.06

$562.06 !

i 29 i Entertainment Center

M

D

$0.00|

$150.00]^

$150.00 j

(5o> Electronic items from
j
j Radio Shack

M

U

$0.00

$105. lOj

SQJfi

1 31 j 20 towels and IS
washrags

R

D

$0.00

! 32 ! Daybed

R

P

$0.00

$700.00

$700.00 !

27

Kitchen table and 4 chairs

$89.00J

$89.00 |

1

1

$95.00 j

$95.00 !

[33

Baby crib

R

D

$0.00

$200.00

$200.00 j

[34

Wooden bunk beds

M

P

$0.00

$25.00

$25.00 1

Stokermattc

M

H

$0,00

$S0.00

m
136

Laundry baskets (2)

!

M

i

D

i

$0.00 i

$8.00

$8.00 |

MII101.M

"M?
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Location

1®

Camera 35 millimeter
with lenses and bag

E

D

138

Skillet, blender, mixer,
toaster, crock pot, 4 sets
of pots and pans

R

D

#

Description

Defendants'! Plaintiffs
Value
Value
T

40
[41

F

1

$5000 | $2.50000!

$5000 |

$0.00

R

D

Electric drill and bits

E

D

Table cloths (2)

M

Food storage in pantry
j® ! and
freezermeat

!

D
r

M

$150.00

$150.00 i

1

1

| 39 Kitchen towels

1 Court's
| Value

1

$0.001

$20.001

$20.00

$0,001

SI20.00 [

$120.00 j

$0.001

$4.00

$4.00 j

Ir

^

D

$150,00

$500.00

$150.00 j

1

143

Love seat

E

D

$0.00

$160.00

$160.00 !

\ &

Rocking chairs (2), blue

E

D

$ojao

$240.00

$J2O00

145

Oil lamps (2)

E

D

$0.00

$10.00

$10.00

|46

Lantern

M

D

$0.00

$29.00

$29.00 j

Wooden gun case

E

D

$0.00

$400.00

E

D(5)
U(5)

$O00

$4.000.00

$2.0QQ,0P 1

$000

$50.00

$o.oo ;

1® Guns (10)
Gun rack
I 50 Lamps (3)

i

u

° -1

$400.00

E

j

D

$25.00:

$50.00

$50.00

51

Lamp shades (2)

M

!

D

$0.00

$26.00

$26.00 j

152

Children's toys

R

1

P

$0.00

$200.00 i

$200.00 |

|53

Child safety gate

R

!

D

$0.00

$20.00]

$20.00 j

154

Records (100)

E

_

D

$oool

$100.00!

$100.00 j

,

Milieu

1HN
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DECISION, Case number 940600116. Page -13-

Description

Source

Location

i E(180) !
R(20)

D

i

$0.00 i $2,000.00 ! $2,000.00

E

P

i

$0.00! $2,000.00 |

$0.00 j

[57 ! Curtains (8 sets)

M

H

$0.00 i

$48.00 i

$0.00 |

1 58 ! Curtain rods (13 sets)

M

H

$0.00 !
+
$0.00

$52.00!
+
$900.00 !

$0.00

#

p
i>

! Cassettes (200)

]®

Stereo, metal, component

; Video tapes (60)

' E(30) 1
R(30)

Defendants'] Plaintiffs j Court's
! Value • Value j Value

^

D

r

$100.00

&

R

•

Nintendo and nintendo
games

[61

Wooden rockers (2)

E

D

$0.00

M

D

$0.00

D

1
$900.00 i

1j
^1
$300.00
$100.00 j
1

J 62 Coffee table and 2 end

i

$60.00

$60.00 1

$100.00

$100.00 |

-

tables
[63 | Mexican rugs (2)

R

$0.00

(.

1

4

$24.00

$24.00

1

D

J

R
M

D

j

1 65 1 Shop vacuum

E

D

!

$0.00

1 66 I Vacuums (2)

E

D

i

$0.00 j

$100.00

$100.00 i

! 67 ! Decedent's wedding ring

M

D
D

j
i

$0.00!

$112.00

$112.00 i

$0.00 i

$299.97

$299.97 j

L

| 64 Wall pictures (12)
1

168

I

M

Plaintiffs wedding ring
TOTAL
e.

j

JL

$0.00

$120.001

$120.00 |

t
1
«

1
1
1

$60.001

$60.00 !

1

j

$2,982.00 $25,556.12! $12,102.02 !

With regard to item 37, the camera: I have chosen to use the defendants9 value
because I was not convinced by the plaintiffs testimony. In my experience, it

mmiM
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -14would be unusual for a camera and its accessories to be worth as much as plaintiff
stated. Plaintiff failed to give me enough information about the items to overcome
my doubts.
t

With regard to item 56, the metal stereo: I have used the defendants' value.
Edward M. testified that he purchased the item used and gave it to Edward K.
several years ago. Plaintiff was unable to give much detailed information about it.
I'm inclined to believe that plaintiffs opinion as to value is no more than a guess.

ANALYSIS
The plaintiff has asked the Court to order the defendants to pay her money for the
following:
1.

For the emotional distress which was inflicted upon her intentionally by the
defendants;

2.

For the value of personal property which the defendants knowingly converted to
their own use;

3.

For the money which she and Edward K. gave to them toward the down payment
on the Sigurd home and toward the purchase of the 1986 GMC Jimmy.
Awiywapytit

intentional Infliction of Emptigmri Pwm
Courts in Utah are empowered to award damages for intentional infliction of emotional
mmiM

ID:
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -15distress. The defendants' conduct must be measured against a standard before such an award can
be made. The standard has been set by our Supreme Court. It has been stated as follows in the
case of JACKSON V BROWN. 904 P.2d 685, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1995):
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961), this court
enumerated the elements necessary for a prima facie case. There, this court stated
that a plaintiff is entitled to damages
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward
the plaintiff; (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or,
(b) where any reasonable person would have known that such
would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
In this case, the standard has been met. The defendants excluded the plaintiff from the
planning and execution of the funeral. They took control of her property and did with it as they
pleased. They denied her any recognition as the decedent's spouse. Their conduct was and is
outrageous and intolerable. Their actions offend against some of the most highly prized of our
society's values, namely, the recognition of marriage and family relationships, the right to own
and possess property, and the acknowledgment of and participation in rites to be performed at
death.
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress at the hands of the defendants. They ought to be
ordered to compensate her for the damages they caused. The amount should be $7,500.00.

winoiji
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -16-

Analysis, part ?»
Conversion
The defendants converted property to their own use. Some of the property was that of the
plaintiff as an individual, while some belonged to her in her representative capacity. The
ownership status is immaterial because, since Racgan is the sole heir of Edward K , she becomes
the owner of all property, subject only to estate expenses.
Defendants ought to be ordered to pay to plaintiff the value of the property converted.
The amount to be paid is equal to the total shown in the "Court's Value" column of the table,
above.
Defendants have suggested that they be allowed to pay part of this amount in kind by
returning specific items to plaintiff, This should not be allowed under the circumstances of this
case. Too much time has passed and there is too much acrimony between the parties. Payment in
kind would only lead to further disputes and further need for judicial assistance. This order is
intended to resolve disputes, not create new ones.

Analysis, part ?•
Money had and received.
The defendants received moneyfromthe plaintiff and her decedent. They received
$1,450.00 which they used to pay part or all of the down payment on the Sigurd home. They
received SI 1,000.00 which they used to pay part or all of the purchase price of the 1986 GMC
Ml

1101M
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DECISION, C w number 940600116, Page -17Jimmy.
Apparently, the defendants continue to own the home in Sigurd. Hence, it would be
possible for plaintiff to obtain the benefit of the $1,450.00 payment, namely, to receive ownership
of the home at the end of the contract term. However, the transfer of ownership is subject to the
prerequisite that plaintiff pay each of the payments as they come due.
It is more likely than not that the prerequisite has not been met. Although there was no
direct evidence on this point, it appears from all that I've heard and seen that Raegan left the
home permanently on the morning of March 17, 1994.1 assume that she has paid no money
towards the utilities nor towards the purchase contract since then. If my assumption is incorrect,
then perhaps plaintiffs should make a motion to reopen and to offer additional evidence.
If my assumption is correct, then the prerequisite cannot be fulfilled and plaintiff has
abandoned her interest in the $1,450.00.
The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as to the $11,000.00. This I wilt explain. In
order for me to make calculations about the $11,000.00 and its relationship to the 1986 GMC
Jimmy, I need to know more about the vehicle. I need to know things such as its purchase price,
its value as of March 18,1994, its rental value and its disposition since March 18, 1994.1 have no
information about any of these topics.
While it may be that defendants ought to pay plaintiff something, I have no basis on which
to calculate the amount to pay.
MHMIjt
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DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -18Hencc, plaintiff should be awarded nothing for her claim of money had and received.

ORPER
Mr. Taylor is appointed to draft an appropriate judgment. He should feel free to draft
other orders that he deems appropriate. He shall submit them for execution by following the
procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this 2 v ~ day of January, 1997.

JfU^

Dkvidl-. Mower
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On January <23 . 1997 a copy of the above DECISION was sent to each of the
following by the method indicated:

Addressee

Addressee

Methodj

Mr. Marcus Taylor
Attorney at Law
175 North Main
Richfield. UT 84701

€

Mcthod.fMnaBi,f=injWBH.fcEw)

Mr. David S. Kunz
Attorney at Law
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite
300
Ogden, UT 84401

^
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURTS

MARCUS 1AYLOR, P.C (3203)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
175 NORTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 728
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
(801)896-6484

' '''' »';"
"' 3',' \ <•:,
L r 7:
' - "' " .'. r V
'47/Hflg q pn u o
J , , m
J
r,t
" ?0
. ^
GL£RK

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAEGAN DANIELLE FRANCIS,
individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Edward Kenneth Fiaiiub, Ji.,
deceased,

JUDGMENT
*
*

Plaintiff.
vs.

*

CASE NO. 940600116CV

EDWARD K. FRANCIS, Sr. and
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS,
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER
Defendants.
This case was tried to the court, setting without a jury, on November 14,1996,
the Honorable David L, Mower, Sixth Judicial District Judge presiding, Flainciff appeared
ID person and by counsel. Defendants appeared in person and by counsel. Evidence was
offered and received, and the case was argued and submitted. The court then took the
matter under advisement. On January 22,1997, the court issued a written decision wherein,
findings and conclusion were made and entered. Based thereon, the court now makes and
enters the following judgment:
1.

The plaintiff in tlus case, Raegan Danielle Francis, is hereby given and

granted judgment against the defendants, Edward M. Francis and Patricia Blundon Francis,
and each of them, for the sum of $7,500, for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

®004

Judgment
Francis v. Francis et ux.
Page - 3 -

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing Judgment was placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid on the 6th day of May, 1997, addressed as
follows:
David S. Kunz
Attorney at Law
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, UT 84401

Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct, executed copy of the foregoing
Judgment was placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid on the
day of
May, 1997, addressed as follows:
David S. Kunz
Attorney at Law
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, UT 84401

Secretary
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Appendix D

GIHHilSOH VALLEY HCSFiT^
ADMISSION HTSTQRY AND PHYSICAL:
DATE:

3-18-94

# 11745

Raegan Francis

CHIEF COMPLATNT:
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: Raegan is an 18-year-old gravida 2, para 1, white
female who is pregnant who presents to the hospital today with a severe grief
reaction, unable to eat, or drink, complaining of dysuria, fever, abdominal pain,
and low back pain. Earlier this morning her husband committed suicide with a
shotgun and the patient unfortunately found his body earlier this morning. Due to
her kidney infection, dehydrated state, as well as pregnancy state, and inability to
eat or drink at the present time and now coupled with acute grief and stress
reaction with the suicide of her husband she's admitted to the hospital for IV
hydration and treatment of her infection.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:

Please see her prenatal record for past medical history.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Vital signs: Temperature 98.2, pulse 60, respirations 20,
temperature 138/88. Fetal heart tones are 138.
ChestClear.
AbdomenFundal height about 28, FHT 138, tender to palpation
bilaterally, she has left-sided CVA tenderness.
Extremities-No cyanosis, clubbing, or edema.
Neurologic- Without focal deficits.

IMPRESSION:
#1.
#2.
#3.
#4.

Kidney infection.
Acute grief reaction.
Dehydration.
Intrauterine pregnancy.

M

I authorize my name to be automatically affixed to this report as signifying that I
dictated this report."
Jy^Mi^.
Richard B. Nay, M.D.
RBN/kn
D:
T:

5-24-94
6-2-94

& m m VALLEY HOSRT.V.
DISCHARGE SUMMARY:
# 11745

Raegan Francis

Date of Admission:

3-18-94

Date of Discharge: 3-23-94
Admitting Impression:

Please, refer to admission history and physical exam.

FINAL DIAGNOSIS:
#1.

Pyelonephritis, secondary to E-coli.

#2.

Dehydration.

#3.

Intrauterine pregnancy.

#4.

Acute grief reaction, anxiety neurosis.

HOSPITAL COURSE: This patient was admitted today in a weakened, dehydrated state,
unable to eat and drink and nearly hysterical due to the suicide death of her
husband earlier this morning. Workup of her urinary tract infection revealed an Ecoli urine culture sensitive to most antibiotics.

She was found to be dehydrated

and in a ketotic state with 3+ ketones and concentrated urine.
left shift, SMA 20 non-specific.

White count showed

Patient was admitted to the hospital and treated

with IV hydration, antibiotics, sedation, counselling concerning the death of her
husband.

She occasionally had a few contractions due to the pyelonephritis and

these were treated with Brethine. Urine culture returned E-coli which was sensitive
to Cephalosporin.

She was discharged home on 3-23-94, arrangements have been made

with Sevier County Mental Health to follow her up on counselling on the day of
discharge.

She is discharged home on Amoxicillin 500 3-times/day pushing her

liquids and I'll see her for her next prenatal visit ir

-week.

"I authorize my name to be automatically affixed to this report as signifying that I
dictated this report."

RieHtrd B. Nay, M.D.
RBN/kn
D:

5-24-94

T:

6-2-94

/f)ATE,
TIME

3-18-94:

NOTES
ADMISSION NOTE: -

-

-

See dictated history and physical.
Richard B.-Nay, M.D./i

3-19-94—r" ve reviewed "her NST s t r i p s Tor" aboutf" " almos t 1-hbur " s h o w s the" baby t o be
reacts
negative".

E^y~is'Ye£ciivVrtheNST"

is

Vital signs~a^

no acute changes"^

" "

'""" " " '

"

"

"

"Richard" T37"Nw7M'.D7/fcn~

"

"
"

"

"

3-20-94—-The NST on the baby looks good, mother's vital signs are stable, continue same
course, temperature has a maximum of 99°.
Richard B. Nay., M.D./kn
3-22-94—Vital signs are stabilizing, her condition is somewhat stable-

We'll arrange for

the patient to have psychiatric counselling due to the suicide of her husband and arrange
for this after discharge from this hospital after we take care of her kidney infection.
She's drinking fluids, taking 40-50% of her meals, we'll encourage her to take liquids.
Richard B. Nayvi M.D./kn
3-23-94—Patient will be discharged home today, 4/ r a n g e m e n t s

are made for her to

have

mental health counselling to deal with her grief from the suicide of her husband.
Richard B. Nay* M.D./kn
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Patient Teaching
Diet & Fluids
Activity
Medication
Insulin
Diabetes
Special Labs
Knowledge of Diseas*
Skin Condition
Wound Care
Irrigation
Dressing Changes
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02
Feedings
Cath Care
Elimination
Rehabilitation
Physical Therapy
Respiratory Therapy

Initial Teaching

Reviewed Teaching Discharge Teaching
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Appendix E

CENTRAL UTAH MENTAL HEALTH/SUBSTANCE ABUSE CENTER
Intake Update
Raegan Francis
August 30, 1994
PRESENTING PROBLEM: Raegan presents herself today stating that
she recognizes the need for some out patient therapy.
She
reports symptoms of Depression and Post Traumatic Stress, as
well as Bereavment of her recently suicided husband.
In
addition, she reports situational stress associated beginning
with, school, living in the household of her parents,, and an
unresolved situation with her inlaws. In addition, Raegan has
a 2-month-old infant. Raegan reports that in May of this year,
she admitted herself to the Pavilion at Mt. View Hospital in
Payson with depression and suicide ideation.
She noted the
impression at that time that she was not going to have her
treatment needs met with out patient therapy, and had been
particularly concerned about the interval before her follow up
appointment. She was reportedly at the Pavilion for 5 days.
She states that she declined discharge medication due to her
pregnancy.
She adds that approximately 1 week ago, she was
initiated on Paxil through Dr. Nay.
MENTAL STATUS
INTELLIGENCE:
The client notes some difficulty
with
concentration and memory, however, so far, this does not seem
to impair her ability to function at school.
AFFECT:

The client's affect was appropriate to the occasion.

MOOD: The client reports dysphoria, guilt, crying spells, poor
appetite, early morning awakening and diminished energy. She
also acknowledges suicide ideation, but is denying any suicide
intent.
DIAGNOSIS
Axis I:
Axis
Ax is
Axis
Axis

II:
III:
IV:
V:

309. 89
296..32
V71.,09

CJL^
Randy Chesly, LCSW

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Major Depression, recurrent, moderate,
No Diagnosis.
None.
5, severe, death of husband.
48, highest level in past year 69.

Central

Utah Menlal Hea 1 th / S u b s l a n c e A b u s e Cen Ier
Treatment. Plan

CI i ent N a m e : r a n o i :- R S H U J n C l i e n t 11 : Birth D a t e : 0 1 / 19/7 6
G e n d e r h_ T h e r a p i s t 41 46 8 Curr Date 0 4 / AJ3JL R e v i e w b y : 0 7 / 2 1 / 9 4
DSM-JII-R
A x i s I:

Diagnosis:
309.89
Post Traumatic itres
Di sorder296.32
Major D e p r e s s i o n ,
urrent, moderate,

Axis

V71.09

11:

fJo D i a g n o s i s .

Axis
Axis

III: Pregnant.
IV: P s y c h o s o c i a l S t r e s s o r s :
^L^lJL-j _i2_t Hush aRr> •
Severity Scale:
1-Thru-6 R a t i n g : 5_
A x i s V:
C u r r e n t G A F : 46_
Highest GAF Past Y e a r :

6_9_

T r e a t m e n t J u s t i T i c a t i o n / R e v i e w : Raegan reports e x t r e m e s y m p t o m s of
d e p r e s s i o n and anxiety after the recent s u i c i d e death of her
husband .
i n-. m e d i a t e
She 1 S at risk for suicide and r e q u i r e s
treatment
Treatment
1
2
3
4
3

I n d i v i d u a l Therapy
Med M«nag»mtnt II
Mad tlanigamant I
S k i l l s Dtvelopmtnt
A l c o h o l & Drug

Methods:

6 Residential
7 Family Therapy
8 Project Change
9 P*ych Evaluation
10 Couple Th«rapy

11
12
13
14
13

Medical Consult
Adult Day Tx
Youth Day Tx
Freedom Project
Other

# 1 S h o r t Term Work Area: D i f f i c u l t y a d j u s t i n g to the e x t r e m e
c i r c u m s t a n c e o f t h e death of h e r husband ._
G o a l : R a e g a n wi 1 i report an a b s e n c e of s u i c i d e ideaJL i pn , and a
r e d u c t i o n in c r y i n g , disturbed s l e e p , g u i i t , and o t h e r s y m p t o m s o f
d e p r e s s i o n and a n x i e t y .
M e t h o d : 1_ F r e q u e n c y : 2 x month
S t a f f R e s p o n s i b l e : R. C h e s 1 ey T L C S W
M e t h o d : JL1 F r e q u e n c y : PRN S t a f f R e s p o n s i b l e : Pr i va te P h y s i c i a n
Method:
Frequency:
Staff R e s p o n s i b l e :
# 2 S h o r t Term Work A r e a : T r a u m a of having d iscovered h u s b a n d .
Goal : D e s e n s i t i z e from emotional t r a u m a .
M e t h o d : 1_ F r e q u e n c y : 2_ x month
Staff Responsible: R.thes1ey T LCSW
Frequency:
Staff R e s p o n s i b l e :
Method
Frequency:
Staff R e s p o n s i b l e :
Method :
#3 S h o r t Te r rn Wo r k A r e a :
Goa 1 :
Staff
Frequency:
Me? thod :
Frequency:
Staff
Method:
Frequency:
Staff
Method :
Servi c e to b e provided by
s e r v i c e ) : N/A at p r e s e n t .

Responsible:
Responsible:
Responsible:
other

agencies

(agency

Type

of

Long-term
G o a 1 /Di s c h a r g e P l a n : Raegan
i_s_ e x p e c t e d
to r e q u i r e
t rea t m e n t o f in t e rmedi a t e __du_rat j qn^_i^_^_G^i
s__tg a^yo i d f u rther loss

of
functioning.
S h e wil 1 be released
reports the a b i l i t y to h a n d l e d e p r e s s i o n
Prognosis: Good.
Has c l i e n t

been

referred

Has client participated
G i v e reason if n o . Y e s

to c a s e m a n a g e m e n t
in the d e v e l o p m e n t

Signatures

£jd^L

Therapi st

Medical

Staff

Lc+j*^

from treatment when she
z\nd a n x i e t y on her o_w_n_-_

Supervi sor

services?

No

of this treatment

plan?

CENTRAL

UTAH MENTAL

H E A L T H AND S U B S T A N C E

ABUSE

CENTER

Intake Summary
Regan Frances
4 April 1994
A g e : 18
CLINICAL

ASSESSMENT

CHIEF COMPLAINT:

"I've been h a v i n g

suicidal

thoughts."

P R E S E N T I N G P R O B L E M : Regan is a 7 month p r e g n a n t , 18 year old,
w h i t e , f e m a l e , of o t h e r w i s e a v e r a g e physical d e s c r i p t i o n .
The c l i e n t r e p o r t s that just over 2 weeks ago her husband
committed s u i c i d e by s h o o t i n g h i m s e l f with a hunting
rifle.
S h e w a s the first to a r r i v e at what was an
a p p a r e n t l y very g r i z z l y s c e n e .
She almost
immediately
went into
labor and was h o s p i t a l i z e d
for 5 days at
Gunni son Va 1 1 ey Hospi tal . T h e 1abor successful 1y a b a t e d .
The c l i e n t is blaming h e r s e l f for the suicide stating
that she and her husband had separated just 36 h o u r s
earlier.
S h e states that her in-laws have become very
antagonistic
toward
her,
initially
accusing
her
of
m u r d e r i n g her husband and
Iater blaming her for his
suicideS h e r e p o r t e d l y was not permitted to attend the
funeral and is not being g i v e n a c c e s s to any of her
husband p o s s e s s i o n s .
ROLE PERFORMANCE:
T h e c l i e n t is e s s e n t i a l l y being taken
of by her family at p r e s e n t .
MENTAL

care

STATUS

INTELLIGENCE:
R e g a n a p p e a r s to be functioning within
the
average
range
of i n t e l l i g e n c e .
At
present
she
is
r e p o r t i n g no d i f f i c u l t y with m e m o r y .
AFFECT:
T h e c l i e n t presented only slightly blunted a f f e c t .
She a c k n o w l e d g e d h o w e v e r that she is not doing as wel 1 as
she a p p e a r s to b e .
MOOD:

Regan
identified with the f o 1 lowing;
poor s l e e p ,
a v e r a g i n g little m o r e than 2 h o u r s a night with recurrent
n i g h t m a r e s , d i m i n i s h e d a p p e t i t e , eating generally 1 meal
a day, crying
s p e l l s , d i s t r a c t e d n e s s and
difficulty
c o n c e n t r a t i n g , s u i c i d e ideal ion as recently p. s 2 d a y s
ago.
N o t e thai the client has a history of s u i c i d e
ideation b e g i n n i n g at e a r l y a d o l e s c e n c e . Shn notes that
her m o t h e r BT)d 2 s i b l i n g s e x p e r i e n c e major d e p r e s s i o n R e g a n a l s o noteo e x p e r i e n c i n g r<=»tru^ive recollections of
1 he t r a u m a t i c rvent , dnni nirhed interest, isolation.

T H O U G H T P R O C E S S : The c l i e n t s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s were logical
goa1 oriented.

and

THOUGHT CONTENT:
As noted, the c l i e n t is e x p e r i e n c i n g an
a b u n d a n c e of g u i I t ,
Also a n g e r .
T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e
of distortion of thought or p e r c e p t i o n ,
J U D G E M E N T : The c l i e n t s insight into the nature of her p r o b l e m
is reasonably good. Her m o t i v a t i o n for treatment at t h i s
t ime is h i gh.
BACKGROUND

I NF0RF1AT I ON

FAMILY HISTORY:
The client is c u r r e n t l y living w i t h her
m o t h e r and s t e p - f a t h e r .
S h e s t a t e s that w i t h
the
e x c e p t i o n of a few m o n t h s she h a s lived c o n t i n u o u s l y with
her m o t h e r . This is her m o t h e r ' s 8th h u s b a n d . S h e n o t e s
that 1 of her s t e p — f a t h e r s a t t e m p t e d to molest h e r .
The
client
notes that one older b r o t h e r did m o l e s t h e r o v e r
a n extended period between the a g e s of 10 and 14 y e a r s
and only ended w h e n the c l i e n t b e c a m e p r e g n a n t by her
b o y f r i e n d . The brother r e p o r t e d l y s h o w s no r e m o r s e .
The
c l i e n t has 1 other brother and 1 s i s t e r .
She described
h e r brother as being her c o n f i d a n t and best f r i e n d .
The
client does not know her f a t h e r . A s noted, R e g a n b e c a m e
p r e g n a n t at age 14 by a boy who she had dated for 1
m o n t h . She has had very limited c o n t a c t with the f a t h e r
of the child.
H o w e v e r , h i s p a r e n t s are p r e s s i n g for
v i s i t a t i o n of the 2 year old d a u g h t e r .
E D U C A T I O N A L H I S T O R Y : T h e client n o t e s that she h a s c o m p l e t e d
the 11th grade of high s c h o o l . S h e is c u r r e n t l y w o r k i n g
on her diploma and e x p e c t s to g r a d u a t e this y e a r .
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

Not a p p l i c a b l e .

A L C O H O L AND DRUG H I S T O R Y :
The c l i e n t
alcohol or drug p r o b l e m s .

d e n i e s any

history

of

MARITAL HISTORY:
Regan states that s h e met her h u s b a n d , E d ,
8 months ago.
They moved in t o g e t h e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6
m o n t h s ago and married 4 m o n t h s a g o .
She is 7 m o n t h s
p r e g n a n t by this
individual.
The relationship
was
d e s c r i b e d as having been t u m u l t u o u s *
Ed's family h a s
d i s a p p r o v e d of Regan a p p a r e n t l y from the b e g i n n i n g .
He
had reportedly threatened s u i c i d e on several o c c a s i o n s .
R e g a n states that Ed had no e m p l o y m e n t h i s t o r y , that he
had had a disabling accident and had seemed d i s i n t e r e s t e d
i n emp1oyment.

MEDICAL HISTORY:
The client states that she's currently
taking no medications although she was prescribed some
Xanax to be used PRN. She states that she has not taken
any. It is assumed that anti-depressant therapy has been
precluded by her pregnancyRegan noted experiencing
some post partum depression with he first child.
She
apparently poses some risk for early delivery
but
otherwise
states
her
pregnancy
has
progressed
appropriately. Client appears to be in good health and
denies any serious illnesses or injuries.
DIAGNOSIS:
Axis I:
Axis
Axis
Axis
Axis

II:
III:
IV:
V:

309.89
296.32
V71.09

PTSD
(Note that the required i month duration
has not yet occurred.)
Major depression, recurrent, moderate.
None,
Pregnant.
Death of husband, 5, extreme.
Current 48, Highest past year 69.

c/i^
Randall E. Chesley, LCSW
REC/dm

Appendix F

r
SCHEDULE OF PERSON AT. PROPERTY

Item

Value

1.

Lawn mower

179

2.

Tiller

140

3.

CD

30

4.

Tools, red toolbox, case

1000

5.

Fencing (railroad ties, wire, supplies)

1200

6.

Barbecue

7.

10 blankets

300 ($30 each)

8.

6 sets of sheets

144 ($24 each)

9.

6 pillows

20

10.

3 afghans

120 ($40 each)

11.

Comforter

39.99

12.

2 full size mattresses

150

13.

2 twin size mattresses

80

14.

Night stand

20

15.

Wooden box and receipts

16.

40 piece sterling silverware set

17.

2 alarm clocks

28 ($14 each)

18.

Metal fireproof safe

150

19.

Shovel, hoe, 2 racks

14

20.

2 coolers

14 ($7 each)

21.

Utah Independent Bank account

90

no value
400

2500

Schedule of Personal Property
Francis v. Francis
Page - 2 -

22.

Money in wallet

1700

23.

Ball bank

100

24.

Ceiling fan

69

25.

Cutting block table

120

26.

Microwave

109

27.

Kitchen table and 4 chairs

89

28.

Refrigerator

562.06

29.

Entertainment center

150

30.

Electronic items from Radio Shack

105.10

31.

20 towels and 15 washrags

95

32.

Daybed

700

33.

Baby crib

200

34.

Wooden bunk beds

25

35.

Stokermatic

50

36.

2 laundry baskets

37.

35 millimeter camera with lenses and bag

38.

Skillet, blender, mixer, toaster, crock pot,

8 ($4 each)
2500

4 sets of pots and pans

150

39.

Kitchen towels

20

40.

Electric drill and bits

120

41.

2 table clothes

42.

Food storage in pantry and freezer meat

4 ($2 each)
500

Schedule of Personal Property
Francis v. Francis

43.

Love seat

160

44.

2 blue rocking chairs

240 ($120 each)

45.

2 oil lamps

10

46.

Lantern

29

47.

Wooden gun case

48.

10 guns

49.

Gun rack

50

50.

3 lamps

50

51.

2 lamp shades

26 ($13 each)

52.

Children's toys

200

53.

Child gate

20

54.

100 records

100

55.

200 cassettes

2000

56.

Metal stereo

2000

57.

8 sets of curtains

48 ($6 each)

58.

13 sets of curtain rods

52 ($4 each)

59.

60 video tapes

900 ($15 each)

60.

Nintendo and nintendo games

300

61.

2 wooden rockers

60 ($30 each)

62.

Coffee table and 2 end tables

100

62.

2 mexican rugs

24 ($12 each)

63.

12 wall pictures

120 ($10 each)

400
4000 ($400 each)

Schedule of Personal Property
Francis v. Francis
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64.

Shop vacuum

60

65.

2 vacuums

100 ($50 each)

66.

Decedent's wedding ring

112

67.

Plaintiffs wedding ring

299.97

TOTAL

$25,396.12

